Security measures play a central role in Georgia premises liability cases involving injuries caused by third-party crime. The question is rarely whether a property was perfectly secure, but whether the owner’s response to a foreseeable risk was reasonable.

After the Georgia Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, the foreseeability of a criminal act is judged by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the property. Once a risk is foreseeable, the reasonableness of the owner’s security is assessed by weighing the cost and feasibility of additional measures against the likelihood and severity of the foreseeable harm. This balancing means there is no fixed checklist that satisfies the duty in every setting.

Common measures that may be relevant include adequate lighting in parking areas, functioning locks, surveillance cameras, controlled access points, and, in some settings, trained security personnel. The adequacy of any measure depends on the specific property, its location, and the risks the owner knew or should have known about. Evidence that female employees were escorted to their cars, or that staff avoided certain areas, can show that the owner was aware of danger.

Taking some security steps does not automatically defeat a claim, and the absence of a single measure does not automatically establish one. A plaintiff must still prove that inadequate security was a proximate cause of the injury. Where a property owner hires a security company, that contractor may also owe a duty to people on the premises based on its voluntary undertaking to provide protection.

Negligence is the foundation of nearly every Georgia premises liability claim. It describes a failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would use under the circumstances. In the premises context, that standard is anchored in O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, which requires an owner or occupier of land to apply ordinary care in keeping the land and the approaches to it safe for invitees.

A premises negligence claim has four elements. First, the owner must owe a duty of care, which depends on the injured person’s legal status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Second, the owner must breach that duty, by creating a hazard, failing to repair a known danger, or failing to discover one a reasonable inspection would have revealed. Third, the breach must be the actual and proximate cause of the injury. Fourth, the injured person must have suffered real damages.

Breach in premises cases usually turns on knowledge. An owner who knew of a hazard, or who should have known through reasonable inspection, and who then failed to address or warn of it, has generally breached the duty of ordinary care.

Georgia also recognizes negligence per se. Under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6, when a safety law or regulation designed to protect the public is violated and that violation causes injury, the violation can establish negligence without separate proof that a reasonable owner would have acted differently. A building code violation is a frequent example. Comparative fault then applies, reducing or barring recovery according to the injured person’s own share of responsibility.

Georgia premises liability law rests on a set of recurring principles that shape how these cases are decided. Together they give a clear picture of when a property owner may be held responsible for an injury.

The duty of care depends on status. Under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, an owner owes invitees ordinary care to keep the premises and approaches safe. A licensee is owed only protection from willful or wanton injury, and a trespasser is owed even less, subject to the attractive nuisance exception for children.

Liability turns on superior knowledge. The Robinson v. Kroger standard requires proof of the owner’s actual or constructive awareness of the danger, together with the injured person’s lack of equal knowledge despite ordinary care. A danger that is open and obvious, or one the visitor had safely navigated before, often defeats a claim.

Foreseeability governs third-party crime. After Georgia CVS Pharmacy v. Carmichael, the duty to guard against criminal acts depends on the totality of the circumstances, not on a prior identical crime.

Fault is shared and limited. Georgia applies modified comparative negligence: an award is reduced by the plaintiff’s percentage of fault and barred at fifty percent or more, with fault potentially apportioned among multiple parties.

Deadlines are strict. A personal injury claim generally must be filed within two years. Across all of these principles, the law requires reasonable care rather than a guarantee of safety, and the injured person carries the burden of proving each element of the claim.

Georgia follows a modified comparative negligence rule, and it has a decisive effect on premises liability cases. The rule recognizes that an injured visitor and a property owner can both bear some responsibility for an accident, and it adjusts recovery accordingly.

Under this system, a jury assigns a percentage of fault to each party. The injured person’s damages are then reduced by their own percentage of fault. A plaintiff found ten percent responsible for a fall, for example, recovers ninety percent of the awarded damages. There is a firm cutoff: a plaintiff who is fifty percent or more at fault recovers nothing. This rule is connected to Georgia’s apportionment statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.

That statute allows fault to be apportioned among multiple parties, and a 2022 amendment confirmed that apportionment can apply even in a case with a single named defendant. Fault may also be assigned to nonparties in appropriate circumstances, which can reduce the share borne by the defendant in the case.

Comparative negligence connects directly to the knowledge issues at the heart of premises law. Arguments that a visitor failed to watch where they were walking, ignored a warning sign, wore unsuitable footwear, or proceeded past an open and obvious hazard are framed as comparative fault. The distraction doctrine can counter such arguments when something within the owner’s control diverted the visitor’s attention. Because these allocations are fact-intensive, Georgia courts generally treat the division of fault as a question for the jury rather than one decided before trial.

Premises liability is the area of Georgia law that holds owners and occupiers of property responsible for injuries caused by unsafe conditions on their land. It applies to a wide range of locations, including stores, restaurants, apartment complexes, parking lots, office buildings, and private homes, and to a wide range of hazards, from spills and broken stairs to inadequate security.

The central rule is found in O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. An owner or occupier who invites others onto the property must use ordinary care so that the property, and the ways onto it, stay reasonably safe. The reference to approaches is important: it extends the duty beyond the building itself to sidewalks, entrances, stairways, and parking areas that visitors use to reach the property.

The level of care owed depends on why the person was on the property. Georgia recognizes three categories of visitors. Invitees, such as customers and business guests, are owed the highest duty of ordinary care. Licensees, who are present for their own purposes with permission, are owed only protection from willful or wanton injury. Trespassers are owed the least, although children may be protected under the attractive nuisance doctrine.

Premises liability does not make an owner responsible for every accident. Liability generally requires that the owner knew or should have known about the hazard and failed to address it, and that the injured person did not have equal knowledge of the danger. The injured person must prove these elements, and any share of their own fault can reduce or eliminate recovery under Georgia’s comparative negligence rule.

Georgia premises liability law begins with a single question: why was the injured person on the property? The answer places the visitor in one of three categories, and the category determines the duty the owner owed.

An invitee is a person who enters for a purpose connected to the owner’s business or by the owner’s express or implied invitation. Customers in a store, restaurant patrons, hotel guests, and patients at a medical office are typical examples. Under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, an owner owes invitees the highest duty: ordinary care to keep the premises and approaches safe. This is the category in which most premises claims arise.

A licensee is a person who is on the property with permission but for their own interest or convenience, without a business relationship with the owner. A social guest is the classic example. Under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-2, an owner is liable to a licensee only for willful or wanton injury, a much narrower duty.

A trespasser enters without permission. Under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-3, the owner’s only duty is to avoid willfully or wantonly injuring the trespasser, such as by setting a trap. An important exception protects children: the attractive nuisance doctrine can impose liability when a dangerous condition likely to attract children, such as a pool or construction equipment, injures a child the owner should have anticipated.

Because the duty owed varies so sharply, defendants often argue that an injured person was a licensee or trespasser rather than an invitee. Establishing the correct status is frequently the first contested issue in a Georgia premises case.

One of the most common defenses in Georgia premises liability cases is that the hazard was open and obvious. The principle, sometimes called the plain view doctrine, holds that a property owner generally has no duty to warn of a danger that is plainly visible and that a person exercising ordinary care would notice and avoid. If the injured visitor had knowledge of the hazard equal to or greater than the owner’s, recovery is usually barred, because liability rests on the owner’s superior knowledge.

The defense is strongest with static conditions: fixed features such as a curb, a wheel stop, a step, or a column that are dangerous only if someone fails to see them. Georgia also applies a prior traversal rule, under which a person who has successfully encountered a condition before is presumed to have the same knowledge of it as the owner.

The defense is not absolute. Georgia courts recognize the distraction doctrine, which can excuse a visitor’s failure to notice a hazard when something within the owner’s control diverted their attention. Whether a distraction was foreseeable, and whether the visitor still acted reasonably, are often questions for a jury. Courts also weigh whether the hazard was effectively unavoidable and whether the owner knew of prior similar incidents.

Even where the defense does not fully apply, Georgia’s comparative negligence rule can reduce an award based on the visitor’s share of fault, and bars recovery entirely at fifty percent. Some Georgia justices have recently questioned aspects of the static condition framework, so the doctrine continues to develop.

When a visitor is injured by the criminal act of a third party, such as an assault or armed robbery in a parking lot, Georgia may hold the property owner responsible under a theory known as negligent security. The claim flows from the owner’s duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 to keep the premises and approaches reasonably safe.

The Georgia Supreme Court reshaped this area in Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, decided June 29, 2023. The court held that whether a third-party crime was reasonably foreseeable is tied to the proprietor’s duty and is determined by the totality of the circumstances. Prior crimes on or near the property remain relevant, but they no longer need to be substantially similar to the crime that caused the injury. Factors such as the proximity, timing, frequency, and nature of earlier incidents all inform foreseeability.

The decision did not make owners automatically liable. Foreseeability that creates a duty is not by itself enough. A plaintiff must still prove that the owner breached the duty and that the breach was a proximate cause of the injury. Reasonable foreseeability is generally a question for the jury.

The court also recognized that a security contractor may take on a duty to those on the premises by voluntarily undertaking to provide security. For businesses in higher-crime areas, the ruling places weight on what the owner knew about conditions around the property and whether the security response was reasonable given the foreseeable risk. Records such as incident reports, lighting conditions, and security arrangements often become central evidence.

In most Georgia premises liability cases, the contested issue is knowledge. A property owner is generally liable only where the owner knew or should have known about the dangerous condition that caused the injury. Georgia law recognizes two forms of that knowledge: actual notice and constructive notice.

Actual notice means the owner was directly aware of the hazard. Examples include an employee who created a spill, a written complaint about a broken step, or a maintenance report flagging a problem that was never fixed. Direct awareness is the clearest path to establishing the knowledge element.

Constructive notice is knowledge the law attributes to an owner who, with reasonable care, should have discovered the hazard. Under the standard reaffirmed in Robinson v. Kroger Co., constructive knowledge can be shown by evidence that an employee was in the immediate vicinity of the hazard and could easily have seen and removed it. It can also be established by proof that the owner failed to inspect the premises within a reasonable time. Where a plaintiff relies on this second method, evidence of how long the condition existed becomes significant, because a hazard present for a longer period is one a reasonable inspection should have caught.

Inspection and maintenance records are central to these disputes. Logs showing regular, documented inspections help an owner argue the hazard appeared too recently to discover, while gaps or missing records can support an inference of constructive knowledge. The owner’s superior knowledge of the condition, whether actual or constructive, remains the foundation of premises liability in Georgia.

Slip and fall claims are the most common premises liability cases in Georgia. They arise when a person is injured by a hazardous condition on property controlled by someone else, such as a wet floor, a spilled substance, uneven flooring, or poor lighting. Georgia ties these claims to the property owner’s duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe for invitees.

The controlling standard comes from Robinson v. Kroger Co., decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1997. To recover, an injured invitee must prove two things: first, that the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and second, that the injured person lacked knowledge of the hazard despite exercising ordinary care for personal safety. The foundation of liability is the owner’s superior knowledge of the danger.

Constructive knowledge can be shown in several ways. Evidence that an employee was in the immediate area and could have seen and removed the hazard supports it, as does proof that the owner failed to follow a reasonable inspection routine. Where a plaintiff relies on constructive knowledge, how long the hazard existed often becomes important.

Robinson made these cases harder to resolve before trial, treating questions of the owner’s and the visitor’s care as generally reserved for a jury. Comparative negligence still applies: a plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by their share of fault and barred entirely at fifty percent or more. Georgia law does not make a property owner an insurer of every visitor’s safety; it requires reasonable care, not perfection.