What is the statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Georgia

It plays almost no role. Georgia has rejected the continuous treatment doctrine. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(a) runs the malpractice limit from the date of the injury, and subsection (b) runs repose from the act or omission. The Code’s annotations record that a statute of repose barred an action where “the continuous treatment doctrine did not apply in Georgia”, and Kaminer v. Canas, 282 Ga. 830 (2007), rejected a variant of that doctrine for a doctor who continued to see a patient with worsening symptoms.

What this means

Why people get this wrong

Some other states do use a continuous treatment rule. A patient may assume the deadline hasn’t started while care goes on. In Georgia, a patient who waits for the relationship to end can lose the claim.

Where the last visit does matter

• As evidence. Records from the last visit can show what was known, and when.
• As a separate negligent act. A distinct error at the last visit has its own dates, though it can’t revive older ones.
• As a measure of damages. Later care shows the course of the injury.

Ordinary personal injury

For a non-malpractice claim, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 runs from accrual. The last treatment date for a car crash injury is irrelevant to the deadline. The crash date is what counts.

Calendar

Treat the earliest possible date of injury as the deadline for each provider. If that’s close, an expert must review the record before filing, as required by § 9-11-9.1. An extension for late retention under subsection (b) isn’t available if the lawyer was retained more than 90 days before the deadline.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Georgia has several tolling statutes in Article 5 of Chapter 3 of Title 9, and each has limits. Medical malpractice narrows some of them through O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73.

Prosecution tolling, in more detail

Section 9-3-99 applies to “the victim of an alleged crime”, and Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393 (2016), says it applies regardless of whether the civil defendant was accused. A traffic citation can count as a crime. A wrongful death claim by parents wasn’t tolled in Universal Health Services v. Hicks (Ga. Ct. App. 2022), since they didn’t fit “victim.” Check the disposition date to see when tolling ended.

Incompetence test

Annotated decisions have asked whether the person’s mind is so unsound, “no matter from what cause,” that the person “cannot manage the ordinary affairs of life”. Records are necessary, and a short hospitalization may not qualify.

Fraud in malpractice

Esener v. Kinsey, 240 Ga. App. 21 (1999), allowed fraud allegations to go forward against a repose defense. The annotations to § 9-3-96 describe the statute as strictly construed.

Burden

A plaintiff who relies on tolling has to establish it. Once a complaint is late on its face, the plaintiff needs facts in the record.

Not tolling

Discovery of negligence (outside the narrow rules in King v. Seitzingers, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 318 (1981), and § 9-3-72), settlement talks, insurance claims, and hospital reviews.

Don’t stack without checking

Two conditions can overlap but don’t simply add up. A lawyer should calculate each.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

A wrongful death suit in Georgia has two years, measured from the death. The right of action accrues at death, and O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 supplies the two years. If the death came from medical care, § 9-3-71(a) has the same two years “after the date on which an injury or death … occurred,” and § 9-3-71(b) adds a five-year repose measured from the negligent act, not the death.

Two claims, different plaintiffs

Tolling that helps the estate only

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-92 doesn’t count the time between death and appointment of a representative “against his estate,” up to five years. It speaks of the estate. It shouldn’t be read as extending the family’s wrongful death claim.

Criminal prosecution

Section 9-3-99 tolls claims by “the victim of an alleged crime”. In Universal Health Services v. Hicks (Ga. Ct. App. 2022), the court held it didn’t toll parents’ non-estate wrongful death claims, because they didn’t fit the term “victim.” That decision addressed those claims. It shouldn’t be stretched into a statement that a prosecution can never affect any death-related claim, or that an estate’s claim is always tolled.

Others

• A city claim needs presentment within six months (§ 36-33-5), a county within 12 months (§ 36-11-1), and the State within 12 months (§ 50-21-26).
• A surviving spouse’s duty extends to children, who share under § 51-4-2(d), with the spouse’s share at least one-third.

Product and malpractice repose

A death from a product is limited by the ten-year repose in § 51-1-11(b)(2) with its exceptions. A claim that was already barred before death raises its own questions.

First steps

Identify who has standing, since a suit by the wrong person after the period can be fatal. Get letters of administration if needed, which takes time.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

A file-stamped copy of the complaint is the core proof. Georgia measures filing by when the clerk received the document, and electronic filing systems produce a confirmation showing the date and time. The rest of the file should prove anything else that the deadline depends on.

Documents by issue

Service is where timely cases get lost

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c) directs service within five days of the server’s receipt of the papers. If that’s met, service is treated as relating back to filing. If not, and the period has ended, the plaintiff has to show diligence. Neely v. Jones, 271 Ga. App. 487 (2005), put on the plaintiff the burden of proving “the greatest possible diligence” in serving after the period had run. A log with dates is the evidence for that.

State claims have extra attachments

Under § 50-21-26(a)(4), a complaint against the State must have a copy of the notice and the delivery receipt attached, and the failure can be cured within 30 days after the State raises it by motion.

Weekend and holiday

If the last day was a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, a calendar showing that helps under O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(d)(3).

Electronic filing rejections

A rejected filing can leave a gap. Keep the rejection notice, and refile right away. Whether a rejected document counts as filed depends on the system’s rules and on the court, so that isn’t something to rely on.

Keep it all together

A single dated file of filings and receipts is what a plaintiff uses to answer a limitation motion. Testimony from memory can’t do the same work.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

The time of a defendant’s absence may not count against the plaintiff, but relying on that is risky. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-94 says, “Unless otherwise provided by law, if a defendant removes from this state, the time of his absence from the state until he returns to reside shall not be counted or estimated in his favor.”

Limits on the rule

• Long-arm service. Georgia can reach a nonresident who committed a tort here (§ 9-10-91), and service can be made out of state (§ 9-10-94). In Towns v. Brown, 177 Ga. App. 504 (1986), the period wasn’t tolled during an alleged absence, because nothing showed the defendants could not have been served under the long-arm statute.
• Citizen when the claim arose. The annotations say the defendant must have been a Georgia citizen when the claim accrued and then moved away (Miller v. Rackley, 199 Ga. 370 (1945)).
• Nonresident motorists. O.C.G.A. § 40-12-1 treats a nonresident’s driving in Georgia as appointing the Secretary of State as agent for service in a suit over the collision. That’s another way of serving, with no need for tolling.
• Malpractice repose. Tolling doesn’t apply to the “in no event” language in § 9-3-71(b).
• Proof. The plaintiff has to show the actual removal and its dates.
• Other defendants. A co-defendant who stayed isn’t affected by another’s absence.

A better plan

1. File within the normal time, under § 9-3-33’s two years.
2. Serve under the long-arm statute or the nonresident motorist statute.
3. Use a skip trace, and document it. If the person can’t be found, ask the court for service by publication under § 9-11-4(f), if the facts support it. Diligence matters, since the suit needs perfected service.

Uninsured motorist option

A driver who has left the state and can’t be located may still let the injured person use uninsured motorist coverage, depending on the policy and § 33-7-11. Service on the carrier and certain steps are required. If a defendant can’t be found, § 33-7-11(e) addresses service by publication.

Fraud in addition

If the person fled while giving false information to hide identity, § 9-3-96 may apply, but flight itself doesn’t amount to that.

Criminal case

If the driver faces charges, including a traffic citation for the same event, § 9-3-99 may toll the time until the prosecution ends, up to six years.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

No. Georgia has no grace period after a limitation period ends. An injury suit under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 must be brought within two years after the right of action accrues, and a complaint filed the next day can be dismissed. A few statutes change how the deadline is calculated, but none of them gives extra time just because a person made a mistake or had a good reason.

What can change the date

• Weekend or holiday. O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(d)(3) moves a last day on a Saturday or Sunday to Monday, and a last day on a legal holiday to the next business day.
• Tolling statutes. Minority (§ 9-3-90(b)), mental incompetence (§ 9-3-90(a)), a disability arising after accrual (§ 9-3-91), defendant’s absence from the state (§ 9-3-94), fraud (§ 9-3-96), and a pending criminal prosecution in some cases (§ 9-3-99). Malpractice has its own narrower rules in § 9-3-73.
• Renewal. If a case was filed on time and later dismissed, § 9-2-61 may allow refiling within six months. That isn’t a grace period, because the first suit must have been timely and valid.
• Judicial emergency orders. A statewide order can suspend deadlines for a defined period, as happened during COVID-19.

What doesn’t change it

Settlement talks, insurance negotiations, treatment still going on, not knowing the law, and a lawyer’s error. A lawyer’s error may lead to a separate claim against the lawyer.

Service after filing

Filing on the last day doesn’t finish the job. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c) directs service within five days of receiving the summons and complaint. If service occurs after the period has run, a plaintiff has to show diligence, and a court may dismiss if the plaintiff waited.

Government defendants

The pre-suit deadlines are shorter. A city claim needs written presentment within six months of the event (§ 36-33-5(b)). A county has 12 months (§ 36-11-1). The State has 12 months from when the loss was or should have been discovered (§ 50-21-26(a)(1)). Those have their own rules, and § 36-33-5(d) suspends the limitation period while a demand is pending before a city.

Waiver

A limitation defense can be waived if the defendant doesn’t raise it. Plaintiffs can’t plan on that, since it’s listed as an affirmative defense in § 9-11-8(c).

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

It can be, if the defendant is the United States. The location by itself isn’t what decides this. The Federal Tort Claims Act applies to claims caused by negligence of federal employees within the scope of employment. A claim “shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing … of notice of final denial” (28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).

Who’s the defendant?

The FTCA’s waiver excludes independent contractors. A contractor running a base gate or doing maintenance on a federal building can be sued under state law, so Georgia’s period can apply to that claim while the federal period applies to the government. Both should be calendared.

FTCA steps

1. Written administrative claim to the agency, with a sum certain.
2. Wait for a denial, or treat six months of silence as one (28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)).
3. Suit in federal court within six months of the mailed denial.

Filing a lawsuit first doesn’t substitute for this.

Georgia law still matters

The government’s liability is “in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred” (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). Georgia’s negligence rules, including premises rules, apply to the extent the FTCA allows. There’s no jury in an FTCA case, and punitive damages are unavailable. The FTCA’s discretionary function exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), can bar claims about design or policy choices.

National parks and federal recreation land

Federal land managers are federal employees for FTCA purposes. Georgia’s recreational property act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 and following, may also be raised, because it limits landowners’ liability.

Deadlines don’t stack

Presenting a federal claim doesn’t toll the Georgia deadline against a contractor. A person with a claim against both should file with the agency and sue the contractor within two years.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

They run on two different clocks. A limitation period starts when the claim accrues, and can be paused by tolling. A repose period starts with the defendant’s act or a product’s sale, and it isn’t measured from the injury. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(c) says subsection (a) “is intended to create a two-year statute of limitations” and subsection (b) “a five-year statute of ultimate repose and abrogation.” A claim has to clear both.

Georgia’s main repose rules in injury law

An ordinary car crash has no repose period at all. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 simply runs for two years, subject to tolling.

How they interact

A malpractice injury occurring in year four has only about a year left, regardless of the two-year rule. An injury in year six is barred before it happens. Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844 (1993), says that once repose has run, the action is treated as destroyed, so a voluntary dismissal and renewal after that date doesn’t work.

Exceptions

• Foreign object. Section 9-3-72 removes § 9-3-71’s limits, with one year from discovery.
• Fraud. Esener v. Kinsey, 240 Ga. App. 21 (1999), let fraud allegations stop a doctor from relying on repose at the pleading stage.
• Disease product exception. Section 51-1-11(c), for negligence claims.

Calendar both

Write down two dates for each claim: limitation and repose. Filing should clear whichever comes first. Tolling for absence or for a pending prosecution shouldn’t be assumed to move repose.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

For a sudden injury it doesn’t matter when the injury was discovered: O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33’s two years run from accrual, which for an obvious injury is the date of harm. Georgia recognizes only narrow exceptions for late discovery, and each one has a specific source.

Where late discovery doesn’t help

• A car crash injury found weeks later. The accident started the period.
• Ordinary medical malpractice. Section 9-3-71(a) runs from the injury.
• Property damage. Mercer’s limit, and annotated decisions, exclude it.
• Contract claims.

Repose can end the claim anyway

A product claim is limited by the ten-year repose from first sale, with exceptions in § 51-1-11(c). Malpractice has five years from the act. A plaintiff who discovers an injury after repose has run has no claim, apart from a foreign object or a fraud argument.

Diligence

King uses the phrase “with reasonable diligence should have discovered”. Symptoms that would lead a reasonable person to see a doctor, or a doctor’s mention of a possible cause, can start the clock. A plaintiff must show what was done, and when.

Practical records

• First symptoms and first complaints in the chart.
• Tests ordered and their results.
• When a doctor first linked the injury to the exposure or product.
• Workplace or recall notices.

Advice for calendar

Use the earliest arguable date. A court can decide that symptoms gave notice sooner than the plaintiff believed.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Narrowly. Georgia’s discovery rule comes from King v. Seitzingers, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 318 (1981), a lead-poisoning case, which said that a cause of action in that setting doesn’t accrue “until a plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence should have discovered that he was injured.” The Georgia Supreme Court then confined it “to cases of bodily injury which develop only over an extended period of time” (Corporation of Mercer University v. National Gypsum Co., 258 Ga. 365 (1988)).

What it covers and doesn’t

What must be known

The test in King asks when the person discovered, or should have discovered, the injury. A plaintiff needs to show diligence, with medical records documenting symptoms, consultations, and the diagnosis. A person with symptoms who doesn’t investigate may be charged with knowing what an inquiry would have shown.

Why malpractice is different

Malpractice has its own statute, with a trigger in the text: “the date on which an injury or death … occurred” (§ 9-3-71(a)). Amu v. Barnes, 283 Ga. 549 (2008), keeps a “new injury” rule for a misdiagnosis that later becomes a much more serious condition, and it says the rule “is not predicated on the patient’s discovery of the physician’s negligence.”

Products

A latent injury from a product can use the discovery rule on the two-year limit, but the ten-year repose in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2) runs from first sale for use or consumption. Subsection (c) has an exception for negligence claims about products that “cause a disease or birth defect,” and for willful or reckless conduct.

Workplace exposure

An employee’s claim against the employer is limited by workers’ compensation exclusivity (§ 34-9-11), so the rule matters mainly against outside manufacturers or others.

Practical point

Document when symptoms began and when a doctor first linked them to the exposure. The defense will try to move that date earlier.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Each defendant’s deadline is calculated separately, even in one case. For an ordinary injury, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33’s two years start on the same date for all, but tolling and special rules can apply to one defendant and not another. Suing one on time doesn’t protect the claim against the others.

Differences that can arise

Adding a defendant later

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-21 requires a court order to add a party. Section 9-11-15(c) allows relation back if the new claim arises from the same conduct, and within the limitation period the new party received notice, won’t be prejudiced, and knew or should have known that it would have been sued but for a mistake about identity. A plaintiff who simply didn’t investigate may not satisfy that.

John Doe defendants

O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(d) addresses an uninsured motorist action against an unknown driver sued as “John Doe.” Using “John Doe” against a known but unnamed person doesn’t necessarily preserve a claim against that person.

Why it matters more under apportionment

Under § 51-12-33, a jury assigns fault to anyone who contributed, including those not sued, with notice from a defendant at least 120 days before trial. A share given to someone whose deadline passed may be uncollectible. Plaintiffs should look for all possible defendants early.

Service

Each defendant must be served. Diligence for one doesn’t excuse delay for another. A defendant who wasn’t served may have a separate limitation defense.

Renewal

Section 9-2-61 is available only for a defendant in the original, valid action. A new defendant can’t be added through a renewal after the deadline.

Discovery help

Police reports, company registries, and bills help identify parties before suit. Georgia also has limited pre-suit tools, and § 9-11-27 addresses perpetuating testimony.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Yes. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 says that “if the defendant or those under whom he claims are guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff has been debarred or deterred from bringing an action, the period of limitation shall run only from the time of the plaintiff’s discovery of the fraud.” The Code’s annotations describe this as a departure from the general rule that “must be strictly construed,” requiring actual fraud involving moral turpitude, or a breach of a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence.

Three things a plaintiff shows

1. Actual fraud, or a duty to disclose that was breached. Silence alone isn’t enough outside a confidential relationship. A doctor-patient relationship can supply that duty.
2. The fraud deterred the suit. It has to have kept this plaintiff from filing. A patient who already knew the cause wasn’t deterred.
3. Reasonable diligence. Esener v. Kinsey, 240 Ga. App. 21 (1999), describes tolling until the fraud “is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.”

Where actual fraud is itself the basis of the suit, annotated decisions say no separate independent fraud is needed for tolling. In a negligence suit, a plaintiff needs fraud that deterred the suit, and the annotations give nondisclosure of a known injury and acts to conceal it as examples of actual fraud.

Who committed it

The statute covers “the defendant or those under whom he claims”. A claim against one defendant doesn’t automatically benefit from another’s concealment. If an insurer or a nurse hid facts, the question is whether that conduct is attributable to the defendant being sued.

Medical malpractice

Section 9-3-73(a) carries this kind of Article 5 provision into malpractice. The five-year limit in § 9-3-71(b) is treated as repose. Esener considered fraud as a bar to the doctor’s use of the repose defense at the pleading stage, so saying that repose can’t be affected by fraud goes further than that decision does, while saying that fraud always defeats repose goes too far the other way.

After discovery

Once the plaintiff knows, or should know, the limitation runs. For an ordinary injury claim, that’s two years under § 9-3-33.

Practical proof

Written statements, altered records, and audit trails are evidence, along with testimony about what was said and when. A plaintiff should write down the date when the truth came out, because that’s the date that restarts everything.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

No. Assault and battery claims fall under the same two-year statute as negligence. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 says “actions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues,” with separate periods only for injuries to reputation (one year) and loss of consortium (four years). What can differ in an assault case is tolling.

Criminal case tolling

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 tolls the limitation period for a tort claim “brought by the victim of an alleged crime” from the date of the crime “until the prosecution of such crime or act has become final or otherwise terminated, provided that such time does not exceed six years”. In Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393 (2016), the Court of Appeals held that the statute “applies regardless of whether the defendant in the case has been accused of committing the crime.” That can extend a claim against a bar or property owner, as well as the attacker.

Limits:

• The plaintiff must be a “victim.” Universal Health Services v. Hicks, decided in 2022, held the statute didn’t toll parents’ own wrongful death claims for a child.
• Six years is the ceiling on tolling.
• Disposition matters. Once a prosecution ends, the remaining time runs. In McGhee v. Jones, 287 Ga. App. 345 (2007), a couple couldn’t show tolling where the other driver had paid the fine on a traffic citation and they pointed to nothing in the record showing the driver remained subject to prosecution.

Childhood sexual abuse

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1 has its own rules for claims based on childhood sexual abuse, including a longer period.

Minors and incompetent adults

Section 9-3-90 applies to a non-malpractice claim: time runs after the person reaches 18, or after the disability is removed.

Claims against an employer or property owner

The claim is still for personal injury, and it uses the two-year limit. Premises claims based on third-party criminal acts changed in 2025. SB 68 applies §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57 to causes of action arising on or after April 21, 2025.

Government defendants

A city’s or a county’s pre-suit notice rule (§§ 36-33-5, 36-11-1) or the State’s (§ 50-21-26) applies regardless of whether the claim is for assault. Immunity may also bar it. The State Tort Claims Act has an exception for assault and battery in § 50-21-24.

Crime victim compensation

Georgia’s victim compensation program has its own application deadline, separate from a lawsuit.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Yes. For an ordinary injury, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90(b) says individuals under 18 “when a cause of action accrues shall be entitled to the same time after he or she reaches the age of 18 years to bring an action as is prescribed for other persons.” With two years under § 9-3-33, that takes the child to age 20. Medical malpractice is a major exception, and parents’ claims are separate.

Three clocks

A claim that belongs to the parent isn’t extended by § 9-3-90(b), so who owns each item of damages should be sorted out early. A parent who misses that date can leave some items unrecovered.

Who files

A next friend or guardian files for a minor at any time. Waiting isn’t required, and evidence fades. A 16-year-old’s suit filed at 19 will need proof from three years before.

Settlements

A minor’s settlement may need court approval under O.C.G.A. § 29-3-3, depending on its amount; HB 620 amended that section in 2022. A release signed by a parent may not bind the child, unless the statute’s requirements are met.

Government defendants

A county gives persons under disabilities 12 months after removal of the disability (§ 36-11-1). Section 50-21-26’s notice to the State runs from when the loss was or should’ve been discovered, and § 36-33-5 gives a city six months from the event.

Product repose

Section 51-1-11(b)(2)’s ten years from first sale isn’t tolled merely by the child’s age.

Childhood sexual abuse

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1 has its own rule, separate from this one.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Yes, if the first suit was timely and valid. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) lets a case “commenced … within the applicable statute of limitations” and later discontinued or dismissed be recommenced in a state or federal court, within the original period or within six months after the dismissal, whichever is later, subject to paying costs. If the dismissal occurs after the period has run, the right “shall be exercised only once.”

Conditions

• Timely first suit. It was filed within the limitation period.
• Valid first suit. The annotations say the renewal petition must show affirmatively that the former petition “was not a void action”.
• Costs. Costs from the first action must be paid (§ 9-11-41(d)).
• Substantially the same claim. A renewal covers the same cause of action. New claims or new defendants have to meet the limitation period or the relation-back rule by themselves.
• Not on the merits. A judgment on the merits ends the claim.

How SB 68 affects it

Since April 21, 2025, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a) allows a plaintiff to dismiss by notice only until “the sixtieth day following the date the opposing party serves an answer”, without a stipulation or court order. Dismissal after an earlier dismissal of the same claim operates as an adjudication on the merits. SB 68’s applicability section says these provisions apply to causes of action pending on the effective date, unless that would be unconstitutional.

Repose

Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844 (1993), held that a medical malpractice plaintiff couldn’t voluntarily dismiss and renew a suit once the five-year repose had run, since a reposed action is treated as destroyed. Product repose raises a similar issue.

Other limits

• Affidavit dismissals. Section 9-11-9.1(f) bars renewal when no affidavit was filed, the defendant moved at the first responsive pleading, and the period has run, unless the affidavit existed and was omitted by mistake.
• Inactivity. A case dismissed under § 9-2-60 has its own conditions.
• Forum. Renewal may be filed in another court, including one with proper venue.

Good faith

The statute’s text doesn’t state a good-faith element. Using renewal abusively can still expose a party to fees under § 9-15-14.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

No. Negotiating doesn’t stop the two-year clock in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Georgia requires an action to be brought within the period, and a demand letter or ongoing talks with an adjuster isn’t an action. If talks are close to a resolution and the date is near, there are only two ways to protect the claim: file suit, or get a written tolling agreement signed by a person with authority.

A tolling agreement

It should:

• identify each party, including the correct legal entities;
• say what claims are covered;
• state the end date, and what happens at the end;
• be signed before the deadline.

An insurer’s agreement alone may not bind its insured, unless it has authority. Repose is a concern. An agreement might not extend a repose period, like the five years under § 9-3-71(b).

Estoppel

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 addresses fraud that deters a suit. An adjuster’s assurance that “we’ll take care of it” is a weak basis. In Heretyk v. P.M.A. Cemeteries, Inc., 272 Ga. App. 79 (2005), reliance on a promise that money owed would be paid didn’t show tolling fraud. Don’t plan on this.

Practical pitfalls

• A settlement “in principle” isn’t enough, if no writing exists and terms are still open.
• A time-limited demand under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 for motor vehicle claims has its own procedures, and making one doesn’t stop the limitation period from running.
• A payment by an insurer, such as for property damage or medical bills, doesn’t extend the time. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-12 addresses settlements without the insured’s consent.

Filing without ending talks

A complaint can be filed and served, while talks continue. Georgia’s discovery and scheduling rules leave room for that, and mediation can follow. A lawsuit doesn’t end negotiation.

Government defendants

Pre-suit notice is separate. A city’s period can be suspended while a demand is pending (§ 36-33-5(d)), a specific rule that doesn’t apply to private claims.

Calendar

Mark the deadline 90 days out and 30 days out. If no signed settlement exists at the first mark, prepare the complaint, and don’t wait for an adjuster’s response.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

No. Filing an insurance claim doesn’t pause the deadline to sue. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 gives two years for an injury action, and an insurance claim isn’t an action. That’s true for a claim with the at-fault driver’s insurer and for a claim on your own policy.

Contract deadlines may be shorter or separate

A policy may require prompt notice of a loss. Late notice can affect coverage, even though it doesn’t affect the limitation period against the driver.

UM in particular

An uninsured motorist claim must be pursued by suing the driver and serving the insurer as if a party, under § 33-7-11(d). A plaintiff who doesn’t do that within the time can lose UM. Reporting to the UM adjuster isn’t service.

Time-limited demands

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 sets rules for pre-suit offers on motor vehicle claims. A demand has a response period of at least 30 days from receipt. A demand doesn’t stop the clock, so it should go out well before the deadline.

Insurance company delay

An adjuster’s silence about the deadline doesn’t extend it, and neither does a statement that a claim is “still under review.” O.C.G.A. § 33-6-34 lists unfair claim settlement practices, and § 33-6-37 says that article creates no private cause of action.

After a payment

Accepting a property damage payment doesn’t release an injury claim, unless the release says so. Read the document. Georgia’s § 33-7-12 deals with how an insurer’s settlement affects other claims.

What to do

If two years are approaching and there’s no signed settlement, file suit. A pending claim can continue alongside a suit. An adjuster may then shift the claim to defense counsel, but the claim isn’t lost.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

For an ordinary injury, yes. For medical malpractice, largely no. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90(a) says individuals “legally incompetent because of intellectual disability or mental illness, who are such when the cause of action accrues, shall be entitled to the same time after their disability is removed”. Section 9-3-91 covers a disability that arises after the claim accrues, if not voluntarily caused. Malpractice has its own rule, in § 9-3-73(b): “Notwithstanding Article 5”, those persons “shall be subject to the periods of limitation for actions for medical malpractice”, with a five-year ceiling in (c)(1).

The test for an ordinary claim

The Code’s annotations give the question: “Is his mind so unsound, or is he so weak in his mind, or so imbecile, no matter from what cause, that he cannot manage the ordinary affairs of life?” A tenant’s own testimony that the tenant could manage affairs outside a two-week hospitalization defeated tolling in an annotated case. Medical records and testimony have to address capacity, rather than just a diagnosis.

Timing

Guardian appointed

The text of § 9-3-90 doesn’t say tolling ends when a guardian is appointed. Don’t assume it ends there, and don’t assume it continues. A guardian or conservator can file. If one exists, the safest course is to file within two years of the injury.

Other claims in the same accident

A spouse’s loss of consortium (four years under § 9-3-33) isn’t tolled by the injured person’s incapacity. Claims by parents and others stand on their own.

Malpractice examples

A patient left brain-damaged by surgery doesn’t get extra time under § 9-3-73(b) if the incompetence stems from “intellectual disability or mental illness,” as that section uses those terms. Whether a physical cause, such as a coma, fits is a harder question. Treat two and five years as firm.

Government claims

A county claim gives “persons laboring under disabilities” 12 months after disability is removed (§ 36-11-1). State and city rules should be read separately.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Only through a specific statute or doctrine. Georgia courts don’t have a general power to excuse a missed limitation date because it would be fair to do so. The question is whether something in the law means the period hadn’t run, or that the defendant can’t raise it.

Possible routes

• Tolling statutes. Minority, incompetence, absence of the defendant, fraud, and a pending prosecution (O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-90 to 9-3-99).
• Renewal. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 for a timely, valid first suit that was dismissed. It may be used once after the period has run, and it can’t revive a claim barred by malpractice repose (Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844 (1993)).
• Estoppel. A defendant whose inducement caused the delay may be barred from raising the defense. Negotiation alone doesn’t amount to that.
• Waiver. A limitation defense not raised is waived, and it should be pleaded under § 9-11-8(c).
• Written tolling agreement. Signed before the deadline, it binds the signer.
• Relation back. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) may save an amendment adding a party or claim, if its conditions are met.
• Judicial emergency. A statewide order may suspend deadlines for its stated period.

What isn’t enough

A lawyer’s mistake, an insurer’s delay, a client’s illness that isn’t legal incompetence, unawareness of the deadline, or a court’s backlog.

Filing errors

A complaint rejected by an e-filing system, or filed in the wrong court, may raise specific rules. A case filed in a court without jurisdiction or venue may be transferred under the Georgia Constitution’s transfer provision, or dismissed and renewed. Those remedies depend on the original being filed in time.

Deadlines other than the limitation period

Georgia courts do have some discretion on other deadlines. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6(b) allows extensions for certain acts. An answer in default may be opened under § 9-11-55(b). The 30-day notice of appeal in § 5-6-38 can be extended only as § 5-6-39 allows. Those rules shouldn’t be confused with the limitation period.

If it’s been missed

A lawyer can review whether any tolling fact exists, including the date of the injury, the plaintiff’s age or condition, and whether a criminal case was filed. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99’s tolling can apply even if the defendant in the civil suit wasn’t the person accused (Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393 (2016)). That’s one reason not to give up on a date without checking.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Yes. Government defendants bring earlier pre-suit deadlines, and the type of entity decides which one applies. A notice isn’t a substitute for suing: O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33’s two years still applies to filing suit, unless the claim is subject to another rule.

State claims

The Georgia Tort Claims Act says the action must name the state entity, not the employee (§ 50-21-25). Section 50-21-26(a)(3) says no action shall be commenced “unless and until a written notice of claim has been timely presented”. Subsection (a)(4) requires attaching a copy of the notice and the delivery receipt to the complaint. A failure to attach can be cured within 30 days after the State raises it. Georgia courts expect strict compliance.

City claims

The governing authority has 30 days to act on the claim, and the limitation period is suspended while a demand is pending without action (§ 36-33-5(c), (d)). The claim must state the specific amount of damages sought (subsection (e)), and it must be served on the mayor or the chair of the council or commission, personally or by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery (subsection (f)).

County claims

A county has sovereign immunity unless the General Assembly has waived it. For example, motor vehicle insurance can create a limited waiver (§§ 33-24-51, 36-92-2). A claim can be lost on immunity even if the notice was perfect.

Hospital authorities and school systems

Thomas v. Hospital Authority, 264 Ga. 40 (1994), held a hospital authority isn’t the State for sovereign immunity. School districts have their own analysis. Don’t assume that a body that sounds public is in the table above.

Identifying the entity

A consolidated government like Macon-Bibb County raises its own question. Which notice applies to a unified government depends on its charter and case law, so the safe course is to give notice within the shortest period that may apply, to all the bodies it may concern.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.