Georgia Premises Liability Law

A sale doesn’t change the legal duty, since O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 still calls for ordinary care. What it changes is what a store can be expected to anticipate. A retailer that advertises a doorbuster knows a crowd is coming, and that knowledge is the core of a claim arising from the crowd itself.

What a sale adds to the case

Hazards the store placed

Temporary displays raise a particular issue because the store put them there. That removes the question of whether the store knew about them. The fight moves to the customer’s knowledge. Miller v. Dolgencorp, A25A1363 (2025), is a warning: a customer who knew the aisles were crowded with boxes and crates, and who caught her pants on an open crate, lost because the store lacked superior knowledge.

Distraction can help the shopper. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997), recognizes that a person’s care is judged by the circumstances, and it cited a store window display that drew a pedestrian’s attention from a sidewalk obstacle. So a person looking at a sale sign placed to catch her eye has an argument. A person checking her own phone doesn’t have the same one. Robinson treats a self-induced distraction differently.

Falling merchandise

Stock stacked high for a sale can fall. A customer who pulled the item down has a different case from one struck when another shopper did so. Ask who stocked the shelf, how it was stacked, and whether any warning or stepladder rule applied.

Injury caused by other shoppers

A shove in a crowd raises the question of whether the store could foresee the danger of the crowd itself and failed to manage it. If the conduct amounts to a crime or an intentional tort, the 2025 negligent security article may apply: § 51-3-50(8) defines “wrongful conduct” to include violations punishable as misdemeanors or felonies. For a cause of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, that article is “the sole and exclusive remedy” for covered claims, and it requires a known physical condition. Accidental jostling is a different matter, and it’s argued under ordinary negligence.

Fault can also be split under § 51-12-33, including with someone who can’t be identified, if notice is properly given.

Finding what you need afterward

Crowded events produce witnesses who then scatter. Get names and numbers on the spot, and photograph the aisle right away. The store’s video from that day is the best record. Send a written request at once, since it may be overwritten, and ask for its event staffing plan in litigation.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

A ranking by frequency would need claim counts by type, and this article doesn’t have them, so the list below isn’t in order of how often each happens. What matters for an injured person is which legal test the accident triggers, because a slip, a dog bite, and a robbery on the same property follow different rules. The table below sorts the familiar accident types by that test.

Accident types and the rule each one triggers

Why the visitor’s status comes first

Across all of these, the person’s status affects the owner’s duty. An invitee is owed ordinary care under § 51-3-1. A licensee can recover only for “willful or wanton injury” under § 51-3-2. A trespasser faces § 51-3-3(b). A person on land opened free for recreation may face §§ 51-3-20 to 51-3-25.

Accidents that aren’t really premises claims

Some injuries on property belong to another body of law.

• A worker hurt on the job. Workers’ compensation under § 34-9-11(a) may replace a claim against the employer.
• A patient hurt during care. Medical malpractice rules may apply, including § 9-11-9.1.
• A defective product. Section 51-1-11(b) may reach the maker.
• A car crash in a lot. The claim points first to the driver.

Who owned the place

The same accident can have different defendants. A landlord who has parted with possession answers under § 44-7-14 only for “defective construction” or “failure to keep the premises in repair”. A public owner brings immunity and short notice periods.

What every type shares

A fall or injury alone doesn’t prove fault. As Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (1980), puts it, “Falling and injuring one’s self proves nothing.” Each claim needs a cause that can be identified, knowledge on the owner’s side, a time limit met, and damages that can be proved. Fault may be divided under § 51-12-33, with recovery barred if the plaintiff’s share is 50 percent or more under subsection (g).

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Two years from the injury is the main deadline for a Georgia premises injury suit, under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. That date isn’t the first one to worry about if the property belongs to a city, county, or the State, since a notice deadline can arrive much sooner. And not every part of a claim runs on the same clock.

Deadlines by claim

Government property has shorter notice rules

Notice isn’t the same as a lawsuit, and the suit must still be filed on time. Each statute also has its own content and delivery rules. Section 36-33-5 pauses the limitation period while the claim is pending before the city without action, and § 36-33-5(c) gives the city 30 days to act. Consolidated governments, such as Macon-Bibb, raise the question of which rule applies, so plan around the shorter one. Immunity is a separate obstacle, and meeting a deadline doesn’t overcome it.

Exceptions that can extend time

• Under 18. Section 9-3-90(b) gives “the same time after he or she reaches the age of 18”. A parent’s own claim for medical bills isn’t covered by that protection.
• Legal incompetence. Section 9-3-90(a) covers those “legally incompetent because of intellectual disability or mental illness” when the claim accrues. A short period in a hospital isn’t automatically enough.
• Crime. Section 9-3-99 tolls a tort claim brought “by the victim of an alleged crime” until the prosecution is final, up to six years. Hicks v. Universal Health Services (Ga. Ct. App. 2022) refused to extend this to parents suing over their children’s deaths, since they weren’t the victims of the crime.
• Renewal. Section 9-2-61 can save a timely case that was dismissed, within limits. SB 68 changed voluntary dismissal under § 9-11-41(a) in 2025, so don’t count on refiling.

A delayed-discovery argument is narrow for a premises injury. A fall can tell a person at once that she’s hurt, even if the full extent emerges later.

The mistake to avoid

The two years doesn’t pause while an insurer negotiates. An adjuster’s friendly letter doesn’t extend the time. If a settlement isn’t in hand as the date approaches, a suit has to be filed to protect the claim.

Medical settings

If the injury is really about clinical care, the malpractice deadline in § 9-3-71 and its five-year repose may apply instead, along with the affidavit in § 9-11-9.1. Check which claim you have early.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Ordinary care, in keeping the premises and approaches safe. That’s the wording of O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, which makes an owner or occupier liable for “failure to exercise ordinary care” toward those it brings onto the land “by express or implied invitation”. It’s a duty of diligence, and it doesn’t make the owner a guarantor.

What the duty requires in practice

Georgia’s cases measure this through superior knowledge. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997), repeats that the “fundamental basis” of liability is the owner’s superior knowledge of the hazard. If the invitee knew just as much, the claim is in trouble. SMG Construction Services v. Cook, 322 Ga. 819 (2025), holds that “[a] plaintiff’s misapprehension of the precise details of a known hazard does not negate his actual knowledge of that hazard.”

Who is an invitee

Customers are the plain case. No sale is needed, though. Georgia’s test asks whether the owner “will receive some benefit, real or supposed, or has some interest in the purpose of the visit”, under Cham v. ECI Management, 311 Ga. 170 (2021). Stepping outside the invited area can change a person’s status, so a shopper who wanders into a marked storage room may not keep the same protection there.

Who owes the duty

The statute says “owner or occupier”. Control matters more than title.

• A tenant running a store can owe the duty for its own space.
• A shopping center owner can owe it for common areas that it kept.
• A landlord who has “fully parted with possession” is under § 44-7-14 instead, and answers for defective construction or failure to repair.
• A manager that took over the premises may have its own duty.

Limits that apply to crimes

The 2025 article at §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57 is “the sole and exclusive remedy” for negligent security against owners or occupiers, for causes of action arising on or after April 21, 2025. Section 51-3-55(a) says no owner “shall be required to exercise extraordinary care” against third persons. So the broad § 51-3-1 wording doesn’t govern those newer crime claims in the old way.

Where the standard is higher

Decisions treat elevators differently. A building owner owes elevator passengers “a duty of extraordinary diligence”, under Jones v. Medical Center of Central Georgia, 341 Ga. App. 888 (2017), and can’t delegate it to a repair contractor.

When ordinary care was met

An owner that inspected shortly before a fall, as in Drossman v. Wal-Mart Stores East, A24A1720 (2025), can win as a matter of law. An owner whose warning sign was itself a hazard may not, as American Multi-Cinema v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442 (2009), shows.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Georgia sorts visitors into three classes: invitee, licensee, and trespasser. The class sets the duty, and the difference is large. An invitee is owed ordinary care. A licensee can recover only for willful or wanton injury. A trespasser is owed even less, with a preserved rule for young children.

The three classes

The test for the close cases

The dividing question between invitee and licensee is benefit. Cham v. ECI Management, 311 Ga. 170 (2021), asks whether the owner “will receive some benefit, real or supposed, or has some interest in the purpose of the visit.” The same case says that someone living with a tenant against the lease isn’t automatically a trespasser, and a tenant’s social guest isn’t automatically the landlord’s licensee.

Status can change in one visit

A customer who goes past a closed door or a marked gate may lose invitee protection at that point. Permission can also expire. A guest told to leave isn’t in the same position an hour later.

Children

Section 51-3-3(c) says it doesn’t alter “the doctrine of attractive nuisance” as it existed on January 1, 2014. Gregory v. Johnson, 249 Ga. 151 (1982), sent such a claim to a jury after a young child drowned in an unfenced pool. This protects children who wouldn’t appreciate a danger. It isn’t a general exception for every minor who trespasses.

A fourth situation

Land opened free for recreation has its own statute. Under § 51-3-23, permission to use it without charge doesn’t “confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee”. So the usual labels can give way entirely. Section 51-3-25 keeps liability for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn, and on a day when a charge was made for that recreational use.

Criminal acts

The 2025 security article also turns on status. Section 51-3-51 applies to invitees, § 51-3-52 sets a far narrower test for licensees, and § 51-3-54(1) removes liability to trespassers for covered claims.

Why owners contest status

Because the duty drops sharply, a defendant has a reason to argue for the lower class. Facts that help: why the person came, who invited her, whether anything was purchased or planned, and where exactly she was when hurt.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

In a Georgia premises case, an injured visitor’s own fault reduces the award, and at 50 percent or more it ends the claim. For example, imagine $100,000 in damages and a jury that puts 20 percent of the fault on the person who fell: the judge reduces the award to $80,000. At 50 percent, the result is zero. But premises law has a harsher tool that can end a case without any percentages at all.

Two separate defenses

The distinction is practical. An owner would prefer to win on knowledge, because that ends the case before trial. A plaintiff tries to keep the dispute in the realm of percentages, where a jury decides. Robinson says a trial court can decide negligence as a matter of law “only where the evidence is plain, palpable and undisputable.”

Fault can go to other parties too

Section 51-12-33(b) applies when an action is brought “against one or more persons”, and the trier of fact apportions among those liable according to each one’s percentage. A 2022 change brought that language to single-defendant suits. Damages apportioned this way aren’t joint.

Section 51-12-33(c) says the jury considers the fault of all who contributed, “regardless of whether the person or entity was, or could have been, named as a party”. Under (d), a defendant has to give notice of a nonparty at least 120 days before trial. So a store can point to its cleaning contractor. If you didn’t sue that contractor, its share may be lost to you.

What fault looks like in a premises case

• Looking at a phone. Courts treat a distraction you bring yourself differently from one the owner caused.
• Ignoring a wet-floor sign, or a warning you read.
• Shoes unsuitable for the surface.
• Taking a shortcut around a barricade.
• Going ahead in darkness, knowing that you couldn’t see.

Robinson also helps the plaintiff here: not looking at the exact place where you step doesn’t establish a lack of care as a matter of law.

Security claims have special rules

Under § 51-3-56, for a covered negligent security claim, the jury must apportion to the third person whose wrongful conduct caused the injury. The parties can’t argue about the effect of apportionment on the award, and an apportionment is presumed unreasonable if the criminal’s share is lower than the combined share of the owner and others who didn’t engage in wrongful conduct.

Children

A young child’s own fault is judged by her age and capacity, so a toddler isn’t treated like an adult. A parent’s conduct raises separate questions, particularly on a parent’s own claim.

What this means for a settlement

An insurer will weigh your percentage when it values the claim. Evidence about what you could see, and why you were looking elsewhere, directly affects that number, so preserve it early.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Georgia premises law comes down to six questions, asked in roughly this order: who owned or controlled the place, why the person was there, what hazard caused the harm, what each side knew, what the deadline is, and how fault is divided. The principles below follow that sequence.

1. Control decides who answers

Section 51-3-1 speaks of “an owner or occupier”. A landlord that has “fully parted with possession” is under § 44-7-14, answering for defective construction or failure to repair. A public owner brings immunity and short notice rules.

2. Status sets the duty

3. A specific hazard has to be identified

“Falling and injuring one’s self proves nothing”, said Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (1980). A person who can’t say what caused the fall has a causation problem, as in All American Quality Foods v. Britten, A24A1262 (2025).

4. Superior knowledge is the core

Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997), keeps two elements: the owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard, and the plaintiff’s lack of knowledge despite ordinary care. Two recent points matter:

• Knowing about a hazard counts, even if you misjudged its details, under SMG Construction Services v. Cook, 322 Ga. 819 (2025).
• A recent inspection can establish a reasonable procedure as a matter of law, under Drossman v. Wal-Mart Stores East, A24A1720 (2025).

Yet routine questions of care are for juries, except in plain cases, according to Robinson.

5. Crime follows its own statute

For causes of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57 are “the sole and exclusive remedy” for negligent security against owners or occupiers. Older claims look to Georgia CVS Pharmacy v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023). The two tests differ widely.

6. A code violation isn’t the end of the case

Section 51-1-6 supports a claim for breach of a legal duty. But “Negligence per se does not equal liability per se”, as American Multi-Cinema v. Gillis, A24A0537 (2024), says. The knowledge test and causation remain.

7. Deadlines come in layers

Two years for injury under § 9-3-33, with six-month and 12-month notice rules for government owners. Eight years after substantial completion for builders under § 9-3-51.

8. Fault is divided

Section 51-12-33 reduces an award by the plaintiff’s share and bars it at 50 percent or more. Damages are apportioned among those liable, and nonparties can be included on notice.

9. Medical bills have a newer rule

For a cause of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, § 51-12-1.1 limits medical special damages to the “reasonable value of medically necessary care”. It also allows evidence of what health insurance would pay, if the plaintiff has it, whether or not it’s been used.

10. Evidence is short-lived

Video can be overwritten, repairs change a scene, and records can go missing. The duty to preserve evidence arises when litigation is reasonably foreseeable, under Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386 (2015). A written request helps protect the record.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

A Georgia owner is negligent toward an invitee if it fails to use ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe, and that failure causes the injury. The word “ordinary” does real work. An accident on someone’s land isn’t negligence. Negligence requires a hazard the owner knew about or should have found, and a response that a careful owner wouldn’t have made.

Breach in three forms

The second and third rows use Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997), and its knowledge test. The third is what the law calls constructive knowledge.

When a statute supplies the standard

Section 51-1-6 allows recovery “for the breach of such legal duty” when the law requires an act for another’s benefit. So an owner who violates a safety code may be negligent per se. Two limits apply.

• Purpose and class. The rule has to be meant to protect people like the plaintiff from this kind of harm.
• The rest of the claim. American Multi-Cinema v. Gillis, A24A0537 (2024), says “Negligence per se does not equal liability per se”. A missing handrail there was open and visible, so the theater won.

Gross negligence

Some questions call for more than ordinary negligence. Section 51-1-4 defines gross negligence as the absence of slight diligence, the care “which every man of common sense, however inattentive he may be, exercises under the same or similar circumstances.” It matters in defeating a release. Monitronics International v. Veasley, 323 Ga. App. 126 (2013), says a release can’t reach gross negligence.

Punitive damages are a different level

Section 51-12-5.1(b) requires “clear and convincing evidence” of willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or “that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.” A long-ignored hazard might be argued under it, but ordinary carelessness doesn’t qualify.

What isn’t negligence

• A hidden defect that no reasonable inspection would reveal.
• A spill from moments ago, with no staff nearby.
• A fixed feature in plain view, such as a curb, with nothing obstructing or distracting. Givens v. Coral Hospitality-GA, LLC, 317 Ga. 282 (2023), includes one justice’s question about how far that line reaches, without a ruling.
• A fall with no identified cause.

Causation

Even a clear breach has to have caused the harm. Someone who tripped on her own shoelace next to a broken tile doesn’t have a case because the tile was broken. In a security claim, § 51-3-55(b) asks whether additional measures “would have prevented the injury”.

Duty comes first

If the person was a licensee or trespasser, ordinary negligence isn’t the test. Sections 51-3-2 and 51-3-3 require willful or wanton injury. That’s why status gets decided before negligence is reached.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Georgia’s 2025 statute names security measures directly. For a covered claim, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-55(b) tells the jury to consider “the security measures employed by the owner or occupier at the time of the injury”, the need for others, their practicality, whether they “would have prevented the injury”, and the respective roles of owners and government in public safety. Measures matter only after foreseeability is shown, which is a separate requirement.

The five factors in § 51-3-55(b)

The last factor reflects § 51-3-55(a), which says that no owner “shall be required to exercise extraordinary care”, and none has to “assume the responsibilities and obligations of government for law enforcement and public safety.”

A known physical condition comes first

Section 51-3-51 requires, among other things, that the crime was a foreseeable result of a third person “exploiting a specific physical condition of the premises known to the owner or occupier”. So the argument moves away from “this place needed a guard” and toward “this gate had been broken for a month and the owner knew”. Section 51-3-51(4) then asks about ordinary care “to remedy or mitigate such specific and known physical condition”.

Adding security doesn’t create liability on its own

An owner who adds a camera isn’t admitting anything. Under § 24-4-407, a measure taken after the injury isn’t admissible to prove negligence. An owner who had some security in place isn’t automatically protected, either, if the known problem stayed unfixed.

Security companies

Section 51-3-57(a) says a security contractor that “assumes and undertakes a duty” to invitees and licensees may be liable “only in the same manner, to the same extent, and subject to the same limitations” as the owner. Section 51-3-50(6) defines the term. So the contract and what the company took on are key.

Situations with no liability

Section 51-3-54 removes liability for covered claims in several settings, including:

• an injury to a trespasser, or to someone not on the premises;
• wrongful conduct that didn’t occur on the premises and in a place from which the owner had the legal right and authority to exclude the third person;
• a single-family residence;
• a particularized warning, if the owner made a reasonable effort to tell law enforcement, and calling 911 counts.

Older claims

For a cause of action arising before April 21, 2025, the older case law applies. Georgia CVS Pharmacy v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023), uses “the totality of the circumstances”, and held that a party providing security services may owe a duty under Restatement Section 324A. Older articles may describe only that rule, so check the date of the injury first.

Records to request

Security contracts, post orders, camera maintenance records, access logs, repair tickets for gates and locks, police calls for service, and internal incident reports. The actual-knowledge requirements in § 51-3-51 make the owner’s own files central.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Winning on fault doesn’t set the number. The injured person has to prove each category of loss with the kind of evidence that category requires, and a 2025 Georgia law changed how two of them are presented: medical bills and pain and suffering.

Categories and proof

Medical bills after SB 68

For a cause of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-1.1(b) limits medical special damages to “the reasonable value of medically necessary care, treatment, or services”. If the plaintiff has public or private health insurance, § 51-12-1.1(c) says the evidence includes both the amounts charged and the amounts actually necessary to satisfy them under the insurance contract, “regardless of whether the health insurance has been used”.

Letters of protection get their own treatment. Under § 51-12-1.1(d), a copy of the letter, itemized charges, any sale of the account, and the referral source are “relevant and discoverable”. So a jury may hear about that arrangement.

Pain and suffering

Georgia has no general statutory cap on these damages against a private defendant. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731 (2010), struck the malpractice cap. SB 68 did change the argument. Section 9-10-184 now controls when and how counsel may argue a specific value. If a lawyer plans to suggest a figure, that section must be read first.

Future losses

O.C.G.A. § 51-12-13 says the trier of fact “may reduce” future economic damages to present value “based on a discount rate of 5 percent or any other discount rate as the trier of fact may deem appropriate.”

A death

A wrongful death claim under § 51-4-2 seeks the full value of the life, without deduction for personal expenses, and it belongs to the persons the statute names. An estate may separately recover medical and funeral costs and pre-death pain and suffering. These run through different people, so a settlement has to account for each.

Limits that affect the net

• Comparative fault reduces the award under § 51-12-33(a), and bars it at 50 percent or more.
• Fault assigned to others reduces what a given defendant owes under § 51-12-33(b).
• Liens may attach under § 44-14-470, and health plans may seek reimbursement under § 33-24-56.1.
• A failure to mitigate can reduce recovery under § 51-12-11.

Documentation habits

Follow treatment plans, keep a log of missed work and daily limits, and save receipts. A gap in treatment gives an insurer an argument, whether or not the gap had a good reason, so note the reason at the time.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

An owner using this defense is saying the visitor knew, or should have known, as much about the hazard as the owner did. In Georgia it can end a case on summary judgment, especially for fixed conditions like curbs and steps. But it isn’t a free pass, and the law on how far it reaches isn’t fully settled.

Where it comes from

Georgia’s liability rests on superior knowledge. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997), keeps the requirement that the plaintiff lacked knowledge despite ordinary care. A plainly visible hazard undercuts that.

Prior traversal

Someone who has safely crossed a fixed hazard before may be presumed to know of it. North Fulton Community Charities v. Goodstein, 367 Ga. App. 576 (2023), is a decision where the rule didn’t apply and visibility went to a jury, so the details of the earlier route matter. It helps to be exact: which door, which step, and which direction.

How a plaintiff answers

• Distraction caused by the owner. Robinson recognizes the idea. A display or an employee calling out can qualify. A distraction you created yourself, such as a phone, doesn’t get the same treatment.
• Hidden in practice. Poor lighting or low contrast can make a technically visible condition hard to see, as in Brixmor New Chastain Corners v. James, 367 Ga. App. 235 (2023).
• No safe way around. A person who had to pass the hazard may argue about that, though knowledge still counts against her.
• Misjudging the danger. That’s a weak answer. SMG Construction Services v. Cook, 322 Ga. 819 (2025), says “[a] plaintiff’s misapprehension of the precise details of a known hazard does not negate his actual knowledge of that hazard.”

An open question

In Givens v. Coral Hospitality-GA, LLC, 317 Ga. 282 (2023), the parties withdrew the appeal, so the Supreme Court decided nothing. Justice Pinson wrote separately that a line of Court of Appeals static-condition decisions “appears to conflict” with the court’s own precedent, and that the notion that Robinson doesn’t apply in static-condition cases “does not seem to hold water.” That’s one justice’s view and not a ruling. Lower court decisions continue to apply the defense, so a plaintiff can preserve the point but shouldn’t count on it.

Comparative fault

If the defense doesn’t end the case, the same facts can come back as comparative fault under § 51-12-33. A person found 50 percent or more at fault recovers nothing.

Practical point

Photographs taken from a standing position after the fall can make any hazard look obvious. Take them from the approach, at eye level, in the same light, and show what else was competing for attention.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Actual notice means the owner really knew about the hazard. Constructive notice means the law treats the owner as knowing, because it should have found out. Georgia accepts both under Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997), but they’re proved in very different ways, and an owner’s best defense differs for each.

Side by side

Two routes to constructive notice

Georgia recognizes two.

1. An employee in the immediate area who could easily have seen and removed the hazard. Being in the store isn’t enough. A manager walking past with a clear view might be.
2. Failure to exercise reasonable care in inspecting. The plaintiff shows the hazard lasted long enough, or that the owner had no real routine.

Drossman v. Wal-Mart Stores East, A24A1720 (2025), limits the second route: if “an inspection occurred within a brief period of time prior to an invitee’s fall, the inspection procedure was adequate as a matter of law”. Dumas v. Tripps of North Carolina, 229 Ga. App. 814 (1997), shows what happens when an owner presents no inspection evidence: summary judgment was reversed.

Knowing the type of hazard, not the exact spot

An owner may say it knew about a general problem but not this hazard. Decisions test how specific the knowledge has to be, so the words in a complaint matter. “The floor by the cooler leaks every week” helps more than “floors get wet”. Prior incidents need to be similar enough to count.

Who counts as the owner?

An employee’s knowledge within the scope of the job can count as the business’s knowledge. A contractor’s knowledge is less clear, and it depends on the contract and control. A tenant’s report to a property manager can be notice to the landlord when that manager acts for the landlord.

Is an inspection enough for a slow hazard?

A cracked step isn’t a spill. Its timeline runs in months. Constructive notice there rests on how long the defect could be seen. Yet age alone doesn’t prove it, since the plaintiff still has to show the owner should have found it. In American Multi-Cinema v. Gillis, A24A0537 (2024), the condition was long-standing and visible, and the same visibility counted against the plaintiff.

The other half of the test

Notice to the owner isn’t enough on its own. Robinson also asks whether the plaintiff, using ordinary care, lacked knowledge of the hazard. Evidence that helps prove the owner should have seen a hazard can also suggest that the plaintiff should have. A good case explains why one could see it and the other couldn’t, for example because staff walk that path, or because the person was carrying a child.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

The date of the injury now decides which law applies. For a cause of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, Georgia’s SB 68 created a statute at O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57 that is “the sole and exclusive remedy for negligent security” against owners and occupiers. Older injuries remain under the case law, and the two tests are far apart.

The two tests

Section 9(b) of SB 68 says Sections 6 and 7 “shall apply only with respect to causes of action arising on or after the effective date”, and that any prior causes of action “shall be governed by prior law.” The article is in Section 6.

What an invitee must prove under § 51-3-51

1. The wrongful conduct was reasonably foreseeable, because of a particularized warning of imminent conduct, or because of actual knowledge of substantially similar prior conduct, as the section defines it.
2. The injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that conduct.
3. The conduct was a foreseeable result of a third person exploiting a specific known physical condition that created a risk “substantially greater than the general risk of wrongful conduct in the vicinity of the premises”.
4. The owner failed to use ordinary care to remedy or mitigate that condition.
5. That failure was a proximate cause.

A licensee has a narrower path under § 51-3-52: a particularized warning, and a willful and wanton failure to exercise any care.

Where there’s no liability

Section 51-3-54 lists exclusions, including trespassers, people not on the premises, single-family residences, and conduct in a place from which the owner lacked the right to exclude the person. It also excludes a claim based on a particularized warning if the owner made a reasonable effort to tell police, and “calling 9-1-1” counts.

Trafficking and other claims

Section 51-3-53(b) preserves actions brought under § 51-1-56, and other theories “in connection with an alleged violation of Code Section 16-5-46”, which concerns trafficking. Section 51-3-53(c) preserves contract claims and claims not arising under Article 1 of Chapter 3.

How fault gets split

Section 51-3-56 requires apportionment to the criminal. Jurors can’t hear about the sentence, the parties’ finances, or the effect on the award. If a jury doesn’t give the third person a reasonable share, the court must order a new trial, and a share smaller than the combined share of those who didn’t engage in wrongful conduct is presumed unreasonable.

Time limits

Two years under § 9-3-33. Section 9-3-99 can toll time for a crime victim while the prosecution is pending, up to six years. Hicks v. Universal Health Services (Ga. Ct. App. 2022) held that parents suing over their children’s deaths couldn’t use it, so a family’s claim needs its own calendar.

Practical step

Under the new statute, the owner’s actual knowledge is the fight. Records of prior incidents, complaints about the gate or lock, and repair requests should be demanded early, along with police calls for service for the 500-yard area.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Georgia asks two questions in a slip and fall case, set out in Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997): did the owner have actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard, and did the injured person lack that knowledge despite ordinary care? A fall by itself proves neither. Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (1980), put it plainly: “Falling and injuring one’s self proves nothing.”

How a case moves through the test

What Robinson changed

Before 1997, a plaintiff could lose on summary judgment for not looking where she stepped. The court called the earlier case law “pendulum-like” and corrected course: an invitee’s failure to exercise ordinary care “is not established as a matter of law by the invitee’s admission that she did not look at the site on which she subsequently placed her foot.” The question became what a careful person would do “taking into account all the circumstances existing at the time and place of the fall.”

Barentine v. Kroger, 264 Ga. 224 (1994), gives an example: a man looking toward the cashier he was going to talk to, and slipping on a clear liquid, had “some evidence” of reasonable care.

Recent decisions on knowledge

Video

Store video can settle a case. It can also be limited in angle and time, and in Morano it wasn’t clear enough to decide the matter. Ask for it in writing soon after a fall. If it’s gone, spoliation law, such as Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386 (2015), may help where litigation was reasonably foreseeable.

Slip and fall isn’t one rule

The rain rule is stricter, and it requires “an unusual accumulation of water”. Ice has its own decisions. A licensee or trespasser faces a different duty altogether. A worker on the job may be limited to workers’ compensation against the employer.

Right after a fall

1. Look at what you slipped on, and photograph it if you can.
2. Report it, and ask for the report’s number.
3. Get names of witnesses and the staff who responded.
4. See a doctor, and tell the doctor about each body part that hurts.
5. Keep your shoes as they were.
6. Mark the two-year date under § 9-3-33, or a shorter notice date for a public owner.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

A warning can reduce liability, and sometimes defeat it, but only if it fits the hazard and reaches the person. The basic issue under Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997), is whether the invitee lacked knowledge of the hazard despite ordinary care. A sign that gave real knowledge supports the defense. A sign that was hidden, generic, or left up all the time may not.

Decisions on signs

• In Allen v. ABM Aviation, Inc., 356 Ga. App. 331 (2020), according to the annotated code, a plaintiff who saw an employee cleaning and a “wet floor” sign had knowledge of the hazard as a matter of law.
• Sutton v. Winn Dixie Stores, 233 Ga. App. 424 (1998), says that no duty existed to warn about water on a rainy day, but once a store undertook to mop and warn, it had to do it with ordinary care.
• Rowland v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 280 Ga. App. 530 (2006), found that a gas station’s sign legs posed no inherent danger. Signs themselves can be the hazard.

What makes a warning work

Warning versus repair

An occupier that knows of a serious hazard doesn’t always satisfy ordinary care by posting a sign, if fixing it is simple, or if the area has to be used anyway. A jury can decide. A person has no real choice about stepping in a required path, and that bears on the plaintiff’s care.

Disclaimers

A sign reading “not responsible” or “enter at your own risk” isn’t a magic phrase. It may bear on assumption of risk, or on a contract. It doesn’t undo a statutory duty by itself, particularly toward someone who didn’t actually agree to it.

Licensees and trespassers

The lower duty under §§ 51-3-2 and 51-3-3 can make a warning less necessary, or sufficient. Section 51-3-25 keeps liability for “willful or malicious failure to guard or warn” on recreational land.

Evidence

Photograph where the sign was, and ask for video of when it went out. Incident reports and employee testimony may conflict. A sign placed after the fall means something else, and O.C.G.A. § 24-4-407 can limit evidence of it as a later remedial measure.

Children and those who can’t read

A sign can’t warn a small child, so § 51-1-5 and Lidster v. Jones, 176 Ga. App. 392 (1985), become relevant.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

A code violation can be evidence of negligence, or negligence per se if the code was meant to protect people like the plaintiff from this harm. It doesn’t end the case. In Hicks v. Walker, 262 Ga. App. 216 (2003), reported in the annotated code, a dispute over whether owners violated building codes in constructing a deck helped defeat summary judgment. The plaintiff still has to prove causation and overcome any knowledge defense.

How a claim uses a code

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 lets a person recover for breach of a legal duty when the law requires an act for another’s benefit. That’s the statutory hook for such a claim.

Grandfathering

An older building may lawfully keep features that a newer code forbids, until renovation triggers an upgrade. So a modern tape measure can mislead. An expert has to identify the code that applied.

Compliance isn’t conclusive

A building can meet code and still be unsafe if the owner knows of a hazard. Passing an inspection is evidence of care, though not a complete defense. Under § 50-21-24(8), the State isn’t liable for inspection functions, with a stated exception, so a state inspector’s error may not add a defendant.

Builder claims

A claim against a builder for a defect faces an eight-year repose under § 9-3-51, measured from substantial completion. The owner’s duty, however, continues while the owner keeps the property.

Proof

• Permit file and certificate of occupancy.
• Local code as adopted, proved with a certified copy.
• Measurements and photographs before anything changes.
• An expert under § 24-7-702.

Equal knowledge

A plaintiff who knew about the steep stair and had used it before may face the rule in Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997), and in static-defect cases. A code violation doesn’t remove that issue.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

It can matter for the plaintiff, the attacker, and the server. An intoxicated plaintiff still has a claim if a hazard caused the injury, but a jury can assign fault under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33, and 50 percent or more bars recovery. The evidence must connect the drinking to the fall. A strong smell of alcohol in a chart doesn’t, by itself, prove why someone fell.

Plaintiff’s drinking

A defense expert may testify about impairment. A plaintiff can answer that a sober person would’ve fallen too, as when a stair gave way.

Crime and criminal conduct

If a person came upon the premises to commit a felony, or was committing one, § 51-3-54(5) removes negligent security liability. Being drunk and disorderly isn’t that, unless the conduct is a felony or a misdemeanor under Chapter 8 of Title 16.

Attacker’s drinking

An intoxicated attacker’s fault goes on the verdict form under § 51-3-56. A bar’s knowledge of a patron’s aggression may support foreseeability under § 51-3-51, if the other requirements are met, including a known physical condition.

Server liability

Section 51-1-40 narrows server liability, as its finding is that “consumption of alcoholic beverages, rather than the sale or furnishing or serving of such beverages, is the proximate cause”. It allows liability only for stated knowing service. Riley v. H & H Operations, 263 Ga. 652 (1993), addresses circumstantial proof.

Passengers

A passenger who rode with an obviously drunk driver can face a fault argument. That’s an auto issue, and not a premises issue, unless the injury involved the lot.

Evidence

Bar tabs, video, and witness accounts are the proof. Hospital blood alcohol results may be protected to some extent by medical privacy rules, and getting them may need a court order or a release.

Minors

Serving a minor changes the analysis under § 51-1-40(b), and it raises criminal issues under Title 3.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Premises liability is the body of Georgia law that holds owners and occupiers of land responsible for certain injuries on or near their property. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 is the core rule: an owner or occupier who invites people onto the premises “is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.” What’s owed depends on why the person was there. An owner isn’t an insurer of safety.

Status sets the duty

The basic proof

Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997), states the test for a slip and fall: “(1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2) that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or conditions within the control of the owner/occupier.” The core question is superior knowledge. Issues of care go to a jury unless the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed.

Fault sharing

Under § 51-12-33, a plaintiff’s percentage reduces the award, and 50 percent or more bars recovery. Fault is also apportioned among others, including nonparties.

Crime on the property

Claims for injuries by third persons are a separate branch. For a cause of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57 are “the sole and exclusive remedy” against owners and occupiers, with stated exceptions. For older incidents, Georgia CVS Pharmacy v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023), says that “the totality of the circumstances informs whether a third-party criminal act was reasonably foreseeable.”

Special rules

• Landlords: §§ 44-7-13, 44-7-14.
• Recreational land: §§ 51-3-20 to 51-3-26.
• Government property: immunity and notice first.
• Alcohol: § 51-1-40.
• Animals: § 51-2-7.

Damages and time

An injured person can seek medical costs, lost income, and pain and suffering, with § 51-12-1.1 applying to newer causes of action. The time limit is two years for injury under § 9-3-33, and four for property under § 9-3-31, with exceptions. Government claims have much shorter notice.

Steps after an injury

Report it, photograph the spot, get witnesses, see a doctor, and ask that video be saved. Don’t assume that an incident report will be kept or handed over. Written preservation requests can matter under Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386 (2015).

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

An apartment complex divides into spaces the landlord keeps and spaces the tenant holds. For common areas such as stairs, walkways, and lots, the owner’s duty runs under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. For a unit fully rented out, § 44-7-14 limits landlord liability to “defective construction” and “failure to keep the premises in repair.” The location of the injury can decide which rule controls.

Where the injury happened

Repairs

Section 44-7-13 requires the landlord to keep the premises in repair, and HB 404 (2024) added language on being “fit for human habitation.” Notice matters. A written maintenance request is good evidence. A tenant’s complaints about a ceiling or a stair may establish knowledge.

Children

Lidster v. Jones, 176 Ga. App. 392 (1985), says that the care owed a child in common areas that a landlord controls “may be greater than that which would be owed to an adult under the same circumstances.”

Crime at the complex

For a cause of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57 control negligent security claims. The plaintiff must show foreseeability based on a warning or on specified prior occurrences, plus a known physical condition that the criminal exploited. Read § 51-3-54(4) too: no liability for a crime by a tenant or a tenant’s guest if eviction proceedings had already begun. Earlier incidents fall under Georgia CVS Pharmacy v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023).

Lease clauses

O.C.G.A. § 44-7-2(b) limits a landlord’s ability to waive by lease certain duties, including repair duties. Check that section before accepting a lease’s exculpatory paragraph at face value.

Who to name

Owner, management company, and maintenance contractor can all be defendants. Corporate records and the lease identify them. A condo or a homeowner association raises different contract issues: Bradford Square Condominium Ass’n v. Miller, 258 Ga. App. 240 (2002), found no duty to provide security where owners had agreed that there would be none.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Public and private schools differ at the threshold. A public school system or its employees can raise sovereign or official immunity before anyone reaches the hazard. A private school is treated as an owner or occupier under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, and students or visitors may be invitees. The defendant’s identity, then, is the first thing to settle.

By type of institution

Immunity in a school case

Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197 (2007), involved a student’s assault. Officials were sued over school safety plans under § 20-2-1185 and over a student’s medical care. The Court called the safety plan mandate “a discretionary duty rather than a ministerial duty,” overruled an earlier Court of Appeals holding, and reversed the denial of judgment on the pleadings. That shows how hard it can be to reach a public school employee individually. Plaintiffs must show a ministerial duty or actual malice.

Hazards and supervision

A broken bleacher is a premises claim. A fight in a hallway is a supervision or security claim, and SB 68’s §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57 may apply for causes of action on or after April 21, 2025, if the claim is against an owner or occupier for injury from a third person’s wrongful conduct. Exceptions in § 51-3-54 include injuries off the premises. A student in a dorm may raise housing and contract issues too.

Children

A child’s capacity matters. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-5 defines due care for a child of tender years as the care that “the child’s mental and physical capacities enable him to exercise”. A student athlete’s assumption of risk can also be raised, depending on age and knowledge.

Waivers

Sports and field trip forms may contain releases. A parent’s release of a child’s claim has its own questions, and a lawyer has to check it against current law.

Visitors

A parent at a game may be an invitee, particularly if the parent paid admission. Under § 51-3-25, a charge can preserve liability that the recreational article would otherwise remove.

Reporting

Child abuse reporting duties under § 19-7-5 are a different subject, and they aren’t premises rules.

Notice

If the State or a local government may be the defendant, notice periods can be 12 months or less. A student’s minority can extend some periods, but it’s safer not to depend on that.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 doesn’t list parking lot standards. An owner or occupier’s duty comes from O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1: ordinary care “in keeping the premises and approaches safe.” Local codes may add lighting, grading, or striping rules, and negligence per se can follow if a code was meant to prevent this harm. The answer also depends on who controls the lot.

Who owes the duty

Boyd v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 347 Ga. App. 140 (2018), reported in the annotated code, gave summary judgment to a store when a shopping center owner maintained the common lot, which wasn’t an “approach” to the store. So a tenant isn’t automatically responsible for the lot. Read the lease and common area maintenance terms.

Lot hazards and rules

In Delk v. Quiktrip Corp., 258 Ga. App. 140 (2002), a victim who had actual knowledge of the condition, equal to the owner’s, lost, and the distraction doctrine didn’t help.

Crime in the lot

For a cause of action on or after April 21, 2025, O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57 apply. Under § 51-3-51, a plaintiff must show a crime that was foreseeable from specified sources, plus “a specific physical condition of the premises known to the owner or occupier.” Poor lighting or a broken gate may be that physical condition. Section 51-3-55(b) has the jury weigh practicality, and “no owner or occupier shall be required to assume the responsibilities and obligations of government for law enforcement.” Prior events fall under Georgia CVS Pharmacy v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023), which arose from a robbery in a CVS parking lot.

Vehicle crashes

A crash in a lot raises driver negligence first. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3 says which traffic rules reach shopping centers, parking lots, and similar areas. An owner’s design of the lot is a separate claim.

Evidence

Photograph the hazard with something for scale, note the light at that hour, and return at the same time. Request video quickly. Notify the manager, and get an incident number.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

The extra layer is control. A shopping center has an owner, a manager, tenants, and contractors, and O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 reaches an “owner or occupier” of the place where the injury occurred. Georgia Building Services, Inc. v. Perry, 193 Ga. App. 288 (1989), treated a major tenant as an occupier of an office building where it held most of the space. So titles don’t settle it, and a lease has to be read alongside what happened.

Control by location

Inspection

Berni v. Cousins Properties Inc., 316 Ga. App. 502 (2012), gave summary judgment to shopping center owners and managers in a trip-and-fall case on a grassy median, because they’d made inspections “reasonable under the circumstances.” A reasonable program can win.

Status of workers

An employee of one tenant injured in a common area can still have a claim against the owner. Berni itself involved a store employee, and workers’ compensation is a separate matter under § 34-9-11.1 when a third party is at fault. T & M Investments v. Jackson, 206 Ga. App. 218 (1992), says that a mall’s security guard was an invitee of a restaurant’s owner.

Crime

For causes of action on or after April 21, 2025, a mall owner’s security exposure is governed by §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57. Prior crimes count under § 51-3-51(1)(B) only when the owner had actual knowledge of them, on the premises, on adjoining property, or within 500 yards. Section 51-3-57 extends the same limits to a security contractor who has undertaken a duty.

Multiple defendants

Each one can point to others. Under § 51-12-33(c), a jury considers everyone’s fault, named or not. A plaintiff needs to find out early who held the contract for cleaning, security, and maintenance, and whether a nonparty notice is coming.

Evidence

A mall has its own video and security reports, which may be run by a contractor. Ask the mall office and the store. A slip that occurs in a corridor may also have a janitorial log kept by an outside company.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Insurance can decide what’s collectible, but it isn’t an element of the claim. In an ordinary negligence suit, the owner is the defendant, not the owner’s insurer. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(b)(2) allows discovery of “the existence and contents of any insurance agreement” that may satisfy a judgment, so limits can be learned during a lawsuit.

Coverages to look for

Who has the policy

A shopping center owner, tenant, manager, and security firm may each have a policy, and a contract may shift responsibility among them. Find out who actually controlled the spot, because insurers can use those contracts to point at one another.

How insurance shapes the case

• Limits. A low limit can cap the practical recovery, whatever the injury.
• Exclusions. Assault and battery exclusions can matter in a security claim.
• Time-limited demands. Southern General Insurance Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267 (1992), recognizes bad faith in failing to settle. The motor vehicle statute, § 9-11-67.1, doesn’t apply to an ordinary premises claim.
• Recorded statements. A liability adjuster may ask for one soon after the fall. You aren’t that insurer’s insured.

At trial

A jury isn’t told as a rule whether a defendant has insurance. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-411 limits evidence of liability insurance on the question of negligence.

Medical bills

For a cause of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, § 51-12-1.1 limits medical damages to reasonable value, and it allows evidence of health insurance amounts, in terms that a lawyer should read closely. That can change the value of a premises claim.

Time limits

An adjuster’s interest doesn’t stop the two-year period in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Only a timely suit, or a written tolling agreement, protects the claim.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

It sets federal access rules, but it doesn’t turn every accessibility barrier into an injury claim. Title III of the ADA, at 42 U.S.C. § 12182, bars disability discrimination by public accommodations. A private Title III suit is for injunctive relief, under § 12188, and not personal injury damages. So a Georgia fall claim is still built on O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, with the ADA standard offered as evidence of what was safe. A lawyer can check for a Georgia decision on that exact use.

Two different lawsuits

Using the standards in a fall case

A ramp’s slope, a missing grab bar, or a door’s force can be measured against the ADA Standards for Accessible Design. A plaintiff may argue that the rule shows what ordinary care requires, or argue negligence per se under § 51-1-6. A court decides whether the standard’s purpose fits this harm and this plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s care

An owner may argue that a person knew about a barrier. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997), asks about the plaintiff’s ordinary care. A person with a disability may have fewer alternatives, and a jury can weigh that. Section 51-11-7 also bars recovery if ordinary care could have avoided the consequences of the negligence.

Government property

Title II covers state and local governments. A damages claim against them can raise federal and state issues, and Georgia’s notice rules apply to any state law claim.

Who controls the barrier

A tenant and a landlord can both have ADA duties, and a lease can allocate them. For state negligence, the question is who owned or occupied that spot.

Evidence

Measure the barrier, photograph it with a level or tape, and get prior complaints. Prompt inspection helps, since a slope or a door closer can be changed. A later fix may be limited as evidence under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-407.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 has no separate rule for festivals. The first question is who owned or occupied the ground, and whether the injured person paid or was invited. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 owes invitees ordinary care in keeping premises and approaches safe. Sections 51-3-2 and 51-3-3 set a lower duty for licensees and trespassers, and the recreational property article may remove the duty if no one was charged.

Who may be responsible

Admission charge can change the outcome

Under § 51-3-22, an owner of land owes no duty to keep premises safe for recreational entry, “except as specifically recognized by or provided in” § 51-3-25. That section preserves liability for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn. It also preserves liability when the owner charges for the recreational use. So a free concert in a park and a ticketed one can come out differently. The article’s definition of “recreational purpose” is broad, and a lawyer has to read it against the actual event.

Crowd violence

For a cause of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, the negligent security article, §§ 51-3-50 to 51-3-57, is the exclusive route against an owner or occupier, with stated exceptions. It requires a foreseeable crime and a “specific and known physical condition” of the premises that the attacker exploited. Earlier events fall under prior law, including Georgia CVS Pharmacy v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023).

Slips, trips, and temporary hazards

Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997), asks whether the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge, and whether the plaintiff lacked knowledge despite ordinary care. Cables and uneven ground are classic event hazards. Crowds and distractions may bear on the plaintiff’s care, though Robinson looks at distractions within the occupier’s control.

Tickets and waivers

The back of a ticket may contain a release or an arbitration clause. Read it, along with what the organizer’s insurance certificate shows.

General information about Georgia law as of November 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.